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MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1923

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VOL. XVII, No. 9

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1923

WHOLE No. 459

FURTHER HELPS TO THE STUDY OF THE METAMORPHOSES OF OVID

After writing the article entitled *Helps to the Study of the Metamorphoses of Ovid* (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 16.25-37, 33-34, 41-43, 49-51, 57-58), I learned, indirectly, of the publication, by Messrs. Allyn and Bacon, in 1922, of a book entitled *P. Ovidii Nasonis Carmina Selecta: Selections from Ovid Chosen to Meet the New Requirements of the College Entrance Examination Board*, by Francis W. Kelsey and Jared W. Scudder.

The Preface (iii) contains the statement that the book is "merely an adaptation of portions <of Professor Kelsey's well-known Selections from Ovid> to the new requirements of the College Entrance Examination Board". The contents of the book are as follows:

Introduction: Ovid and His Works (1-14), The Greek and the Roman Mythology (15-49); Text (the stories of Cadmus, Pyramus and Thisbe, Perseus, Niobe, Daedalus and Icarus, Orpheus and Eurydice, and Midas, exactly as prescribed by the College Entrance Examination Board (51-77); Passages for Sight Reading, with notes at the foot of the page (79-90: Deucalion and Pyrrha [79-84], Philemon and Baucis [85-90]); Notes (91-116); English Pronunciation of Proper Names (117-119); Reading Latin Verse (120-130); Vocabulary (1-66).

During the current year, Messrs. Ginn and Company have brought out a revision of the Allen and Greenough Vergil. The revision, by G. L. Kittredge, and Thornton Jenkins, contains Books 1-6 of the Aeneid, "The Completion of the Story by Selections and Summaries", and "Ovid's Metamorphoses, The Sections Required for Entrance to College in the Years 1923-1925".

The portion of the book devoted to Ovid covers pages 265-302 (Text, Illustrations), and 195-219 (Notes). Some part of the Vocabulary (1-169) also belongs to Ovid: in their Preface (iv) the revisers say,

The Vocabulary has been simplified, and much reduced in bulk. It comprises all the words found in the present volume. The complete Vocabulary to Virgil's works may still be obtained of the publishers.

(3) In my former paper, I failed to mention an admirable paper by my colleague, Professor Nelson Glenn McCrea, entitled *Ovid's Use of Colour and of Colour-Terms*, which is to be found on pages 180-194 of the volume called *Classical Studies in Honour of Henry Drisler* (New York, Macmillan and Company, 1894). The volume, by the way, consists of papers written by various pupils of Professor Drisler in commemoration of the fiftieth year of his official connection with Columbia College. Professor McCrea's paper is well worth most careful study by every teacher, not only of Ovid, but of every Latin poet.

Professor McCrea begins by noting that in the chapter on Ovid by W. Y. Sellar, in *Horace and the Elegiac Poets*, there is but a single reference, in the discussion of Ovid, to Ovid's love of color. He then writes as follows (180):

... This is, notwithstanding, one of the most characteristic aspects of the poet's artistic temperament. Less prominent, certainly, in the poems of exile than in those of the happier years that preceded, Ovid's sensuous delight in the play of colour finds its expression in the work of every period of his life, now in isolated touches, now in highly wrought passages of chromatic harmony or contrast. In his perception of landscape the note of colour is conspicuously present. The changing lights of sea and of sky, especially the glories of the dawn, have for him an unceasing attraction. And, as in his studies of nature, so in the pictures of the beings, divine and human, that move amid his varied scenes, colour is one of the most noticeable elements in the composition. To quote but a few instances out of many, we find in the *Metamorphoses* <2.107-118> "the wonderful description that gave the idea of Guido's famous picture of Aurora".

On page 182 Professor McCrea sets forth the three-fold aim of his paper, as follows:

(1) To present in an orderly manner, following as far as possible the succession found in the spectrum, all instances of the use of each colour-term, with a view of determining in detail the range of the term in question and also the range of the poet's observation of colour in nature.

(2) To note the effect of change in the environment of objects upon the choice of the colour-term in the (comparatively few) cases in which the epithets applied vary.

(3) To determine Ovid's colour-preferences.

The various colour-terms are then discussed in sequence (183-193).

On pages 193-194 Professor McCrea sums up his results, subjecting the material presented on pages 183-193 "to quantitative treatment in comparison with the diffusion of colour in the spectrum..." His conclusions are as follows:

Remembering now that the "warm colours are, in painter's language, the reds, red-yellows, and yellows that make the upper half of the spectrum" (Price¹, p. 18), we note that Ovid has 715 parts of warm colour, as opposed to 285 parts of cold colour. The ratio in the spectrum is 595 to 405. Again, remembering that "in respect of luminosity, the colours of the spectrum grade downward from yellow, the most luminous, through green and red and blue to violet, the least luminous of all" (Price¹, p. 18), we note that Ovid decidedly prefers the most luminous colours, markedly exceeding the spectrum proportion in yellow, and, to a less extent, in green.

These last results, though differing in detail, are yet essentially the same as those reached by Professor Price¹ for Vergil. Both poets in their use of colour

¹These references are to an article entitled *The Color-System of Vergil*, by Thomas R. Price, *American Journal of Philology* 4.1-20.

idealize the world about them. But, in Ovid, endowed with a far more sensuous nature than that of Vergil, the contrast between the real and its "counterfeit presentment" is more sharply defined, the colours are more vivid and glowing.

(4) In 1911, Messrs. Macmillan and Co., London, brought out a very interesting and suggestive book, entitled *The Outdoor Life in Greek and Roman Poets and Kindred Studies*, by The Countess Evelyn Martynengo Cesaresco (Pp. x + 290). In an Introductory Note (vii) the author says,

This book grew out of my own life south of the Alps. I have walked with Virgil in his fields, and listened with Theocritus to Sicilian folk-songs. The poets of the Old World became for me not dead poets but living men—living observers of things I could observe myself every day. Antiquity was not past but present.

Since this book is, I fear, not as well known as it deserves to be, I give in full its table of contents:

I. The Peasant of Ancient Greece <1-24: deals with the Iliad, the Odyssey, and Hesiod>; II. Husbandry in the Greek Dramatists <25-38>; III. The Attic Homestead <39-58: based on Xenophon, Oeconomicus>; IV. The Last Greek Peasant <59-78>; V. Nature in the Earlier Roman Poets <79-95>; VI. A Prose Source of the *Georgics* <96-124: an account of Varro, *De Re Rustica*>; VII. Virgil in the Country <125-143>; VIII. Tibullus at his Farm <144-156>; IX. Ovid and the Natural World <157-175>; X. The Roman's Villeggiatura <176-198>; XI. Nature in the Last Latin Poets <199-216: Ausonius, Claudian, Rutilius>; XII. Transformation <217-234>; XIII. The Divine Pastoral <235-245>; XIV. Puer Parvulus <246-266: a study of the cult of the Infant Savior in Italy; the author says, on page 246: ". . . the religion of the peasant has reminded me as often as his agricultural methods of the continuity of life in Southern lands">; XV. The Modern Pastoral in Italy <267-290>.

The paper on Ovid is of great interest, though, unfortunately, the author does not give specific references to the parts of Ovid of which she is writing. She evidently had, throughout, both the *Fasti* and the *Metamorphoses* in mind. It would be a most interesting and most instructive way to spend some time to read both *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* with the Countess Cesaresco's book open before one, and to set on the margins of its pages the appropriate references to Ovid's writings. I shall give a running summary of the paper, with a few extracts in full.

The author begins the more definite part of the paper by saying (159) that it is perfectly natural that "the primitive mind should have supposed a close kinship between all forms of life", and that it should have been unable to distinguish between life and no life, and be unconscious

. . . of that ultimate gulf which seems so absolutely impassable to our average intelligence, and before which the hardest man of science still stands doubting. This is a point on which backward races throw a great deal of light. A recent observer states, for instance, that to the Indian of South America "all objects, animate and inanimate, seem exactly of the same nature, except that they differ in the accident of bodily form". Again, it is quite sure that children are constantly lapsing into ignorance of the existence of any hard and fast line of division. A little girl may *know* that her doll does not feel, but she *believes* that it does

feel; her knowledge resting on the assertions of persons whose word she is accustomed to accept, while her belief rests on an instinct, old as man, to think spirit or spiritual powers into matter. . . . I myself recollect the anguish exhibited by an Italian peasant child during an operation performed on her doll; to adjust an injured limb the scissors had to be used and at every snip the child, who was nevertheless trying to control her feelings, turned white as marble and uttered a stifled sob. What she thought I do not know, but she instinctively felt that the doll was suffering pain. An identical instinct is at the bottom of all fetichism, image-worship and magic, whether black or white, in which matter is employed as a vehicle.

Next (161-162) the scope of Ovid's knowledge of legends, prejudices, customs, rites, and tales is emphasized, and stress is laid on the fact that Ovid gained his knowledge of the tales in larger measure "by his own travels in Greece and Sicily, still an entirely Greek land, though a Roman conquest. He drank in the Greek spirit at its source, a spirit partly, but never wholly, acclimatized among the people of Italy".

I quote next, in full, a paragraph from pages 162-163, for two reasons—one affecting our study of Ovid, the other affecting our study of Cicero. So far as the quotation touches Ovid, I would have the reader ponder it in connection with my remarks on Nature in Ovid, *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 16.17-18. The quotation will, I am sure, help us to understand better the emotional state of both Cicero and Ovid when they were forcefully removed from Rome—from home. When we understand better that emotional state, we colder-natured Northerners, especially we Anglo-Saxons who have made a cult of the repression of all outward admission of emotion, may be a bit juster in our judgments of the two Italians.

Ovid was almost morbidly affected by climate and natural surroundings. He had that nostalgia of the South from which Southern Italians, including those who are only partially educated, suffer severely when obliged to live even in the north of Italy. A cook from the south, who had gone to a place near Udine, wrote to me that he was going to leave his situation; he had nothing to complain of in his master and mistress, but the "paese" was "totally impossible to live in". It is not that their health generally suffers; they can bear the cold well; it is their spirits that give way. Ovid writes from Tomi. . . that he is sorry to have offended the inhabitants by what he has said about their country; they have always been kind and hospitable, but how can they expect him to praise their climate? It makes even health hateful to him; all the year round it is cold; spring brings no flowers, nor does summer see "the naked bodies of the reapers"; the soil yields chiefly wormwood; there are no singing birds, except, perhaps, in the distant forest; what streams there are, are of brackish water.

Next, the Countess Cesaresco notes (164) that it was a fixed habit of mind with Ovid to put himself "into the place of plants and animals, . . . thinking how one would think in their position". In illustrating her point here she ascribes, without hesitation, to Ovid, as a poem of his youth, the piece entitled *Nux*, the plaint of a tree against ill-usage, which Mr. Duff, in his *Literary History of Rome*, 588, refuses to believe a product of Ovid's pen. On pages 164-165 she declares that Ovid, long before Darwin's day, was observant

enough to credit animals with the device of "protective coloration". On page 165 there is a brief reference to Ovid's love of animals.

In the last ten pages of her essay (165-175), the Countess Cesaresco several times dwells on Ovid's repugnance to animal sacrifices. Especially noteworthy are these sentences (166):

... Some poets of the Greek *Anthology* touched lightly on the same subject; but Ovid returns to it persistently. We cannot help asking whether the Roman priesthood could have heard a fundamental institution of orthodoxy so openly attacked without becoming hostile to the raiser of such inconvenient questions.

Are we approaching here the much-vexed—and still unsolved—question of the reason or reasons for Ovid's banishment?

On pages 167-170 there is a very interesting discussion of the Philemon-Baucis story. Speaking of the command of the immortal visitors that the single goose that guarded the cottage of the aged couple, which they were minded none the less to sacrifice in entertainment of their guests, should be spared, the author says (169), "So Ovid made a present to Jove of the kindest trait ever recorded of him". Of the passing, finally, of the aged couple, the author writes thus, finely (170):

... they had no pain of parting, neither did one look upon the other's tomb. How much truer and more touching is this conclusion than that which an inferior story-teller would have resorted to, and which actually figures in some modern versions of the story, namely, the transformation of Philemon and Baucis into young people!

Next, the Countess Cesaresco writes finely of the story of Ceres's search for Proserpina (171-173). She dwells in particular on the peasant hospitality given to Ceres during her search. Inasmuch as it is the fashion to declare that Ovid writes with little or no real feeling, I quote the sentence with which the author concludes the story of Ceres's meeting with the old peasant, and of her restoration of his dying child to full life and vigor: "The tale of the commonest grief and gladness was never more feelingly told". Of kindred significance is the following passage (171-172), touching Ovid's two treatments of the legend of Proserpina, one in the *Fasti*, one in the *Metamorphoses*:

... The most romantic of all classic myths, it attracted him by its appeal to human sympathies, its swift movement, and its picturesqueness. What scene ever made so charming a picture as that of Proserpine and her girl companions in the meads of Enna? The Greek genius, which invented so many things, invented the type of joyous, healthy, active girlhood, fearless and fancy free, which nearly went out of the world till it came back with Shakespeare. Ovid could see the beauty of that type, and his maidens hurry and scurry in their innocent sport, full of true life and careless rapture; this one plucking marigolds, that one wild hyacinths, others amaranth and thyme and rosemary and many a nameless flower, while she, the fairest, gathers the fragile crocus and white lilies. Girls and flowers, which are most a part of nature?

(To be concluded)

CHARLES KNAPP

CICERO AND THE GREAT SOCIETY¹

A few years ago Mr. Graham Wallas, of the London School of Economics, made a valuable contribution to social science in a book called *The Great Society*. By this phrase the author means society in the widest sense, in its inevitable modern enlargement due to economic and industrial expansion and to increased means of communication. The author raised the questions that we are still asking in concern and disquiet in 1923—Can the fabric of our civilization endure? Will the Great Society be permanent? Has it virtue to withstand the forces of disruption that threaten it? He attempts to answer these questions by applying the new discoveries of psychology to social problems.

I have borrowed from Mr. Wallas his striking phrase, *The Great Society*, to describe my topic to-day. I have made a few observations on Cicero's view of the social organism, of men in their relation to mankind, of the best means of dealing with the evils of society.

'We alone have brought philosophy into the Forum', boasted Cicero, *Ad Fam.* 15. 1.6, and I feel that we have evidence that he made good this claim by harmonizing his conduct, so far as man may, with his belief.

Several of his social theories have a surprisingly modern ring. Modern students have no better way to solve our sociological problems than to apply in detail the general principles that Cicero suggested when he wrote on the origin of society, its aims, and the means by which it can be kept in health.

Cicero approaches the question of social life just as our psychologists do, finding its origin in what they call the gregarious instinct. Professor Giddings² calls it the "Consciousness of Kind", and declares it to be the basic principle of social organization. Cicero usually speaks as if the instinct for society grew out of the family instinct, but sometimes he speaks as if the two were equally primitive. Thus, he says (*De Finibus* 2.45):

... Reason... has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens, and later with all mankind.

But he also says that, just as we use our limbs before we know for what purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we meet by nature in the common society of the State (*De Finibus* 3.66). Again, he asserts that men are like bees, that do not swarm for the sake of forming a honeycomb, but, having assembled, do form a honeycomb (*De Officiis* 1.157).

Society, in this view, is not a 'social contract', deliberately formed for the sake of its advantages. It grows out of a still deeper need of men—that for companionship. It is not true, Cicero said, that, if all men's wants were supplied as by a magic wand, men of superior mind would apply themselves exclusively to learning. 'Such a man would flee his solitude and seek a companion in his studies, wishing now to teach, now

¹This paper was read at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, at Rutgers College, May 5, 1923.

²*Principles of Sociology*, 18.

to learn, now to listen, now to speak' (*De Officiis* 1. 158).

The importance of this psychological approach to the study of society lies in the fact that rules of conduct that are alien to their real nature cannot be imposed on men. 'All the virtues fall', as Cicero said (*De Legibus* 1.43), 'if nature does not confirm law. They all originate in our natural propensity to love our fellowmen; and this is the foundation of justice'.

We find the modern writers on sociology making the same effort to apply the facts of psychology to social organization. Says Wallas³,

This book is written with the practical purpose of bringing the knowledge which has been accumulated by psychologists into touch with the actual problems of present civilized life.

It is impossible, Professor McDougall tells us, to reach any large ideal of service to humanity except by way of the minor group sentiments. The great error of Plato in the *Republic* was in ignoring family sentiment⁴.

... Where the family sentiment and the smaller group sentiments are strong, there the wider group sentiments are strong and good citizenship, patriotism and ready devotion to public service of all kinds are the rule. . . .⁵ The attempt to reach the larger ideal by any other road but that of experience is bound to fail, because it is psychologically unsound⁶.

And Dean Inge, on the same theme, asks, "If they love not those whom they have seen, how shall they love those whom they have not seen?"

Cicero approaches his study of society not only from the point of view of psychology, but also from that of philosophy. We have seen that men are drawn together by the common possession of reason. Cicero inherited from the Stoics the belief that men's souls are part of the world-soul, or, in the religious language used by Cicero himself, that in men's mortal bodies a divine soul has been implanted by God (*De Legibus* 1. 24). This soul, or reason, identical in all men, distinguishing them from the beasts and uniting them to God (*De Officiis* 1.50 and *De Legibus* 1.23) forms the true basis of human society. In this view, society has no limits short of all humanity. The ideal society is a world-brotherhood.

So, on the one hand, Cicero the psychologist draws a picture of man instinctively reaching out for companionship to mate, child, kinsfolk, to those kindred souls he calls his friends, then to his country, and last of all to the general company of mankind. That is the psychological order of development. On the other hand, Cicero the philosopher tells us that men, by virtue of possessing souls, form one great spiritual commonwealth. The smaller groups, native country, town, friends, kindred, mate, and child are subdivisions of the larger group (*De Officiis* 1.53-54).

It seems to me that Cicero always balanced the narrower impulse, that of sympathy with the smaller groups, by the wider philosophic outlook. The ideal

world-brotherhood of the Stoics naturally inspired a sentiment of internationalism⁷. Cicero warmly embraced this doctrine, but combined it with the most ardent patriotism. 'Of all unions', he says (*De Officiis* 1.57), 'none is closer, none dearer than that which binds each one of us to the State'.

"While there were able statesmen among Stoics of the Roman period", says Zeller (326)⁸, "Rome and not Stoicism was the cause of their statesmanship". In the case of Cicero, a passionate and life-long love of country was softened in its quality and elevated in its aims by his faith in the essential value of all men.

A German scholar⁹, writing on Cicero's relation to international morality, traces what he thinks is an evolution in Cicero's views from an aggressive imperialism in his earlier years to a more humane and international view in his later life. Certainly it is true that, in the political and philosophical works of his mature years, Cicero is the advocate of peace. He glorifies Numa as the king who civilized the warlike hearts of his people by the influences of religion (*De Re Publica* 2.26). He declares that arbitration befits the nature of men better than war, and that only the failure of arbitration makes recourse to war permissible (*De Officiis* 1.34). In another passage he says that the only justifiable reasons for war are good faith (i. e. to allies and dependents) and self-defence (*De Re Publica* 3.34). He deplores the cruelty that made the Romans destroy Corinth, since 'cruelty is utterly alien to the nature of man' (*De Officiis* 3.46).

As for those who have done us an injury, their repentance should satisfy us (*De Officiis* 1.33). Vanquished enemies should be received under the protection of the victorious general; this was the ancient Roman custom, according to which conquerors became the patrons of the cities they had subdued (*De Officiis* 1.35).

Of all human relations, friendship was the tenderest. In the familiar essay on Friendship (the *Laelius*) we see how Cicero linked friendship to the Great Society. Friendship is the very essence of the human relation. 'Out of the boundless society of the human race, which nature has formed, <friendship> is a matter so concentrated and drawn within so narrow a compass that all its affection is confined to two beings or, at most, to a few' (*Laelius* 20). How real this view of friendship was to Cicero we can believe when we read this cry from his heart to Atticus: 'I want you, I have need of you, I am waiting for you. I have a thousand things that disurb and vex me, and a single walk with you will relieve me' (*Ad Att.* 1.18.1). But the law of the Great Society, justice, like a great balance-wheel, must regulate the motions of this warm human impulse. 'Then let this law be established in friendship, that we neither ask things that are improper, nor grant them if asked' (*Laelius* 40).

The conception of society as based on the solidarity of mankind, on the likeness of men, not on their differences, naturally led to a sentiment of democracy.

³The Great Society, 18 (New York, 1914, reprinted 1919).

⁴Wm. McDougall, *The Group Mind*, 116 (New York, 1920).

⁵*Ibidem*, 114.

⁶*Ibidem*, 248.

⁷E. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, 328 (London, 1892).

⁸S. Spitzer, writing in *Festschrift für Th. Gomperz*, 208 (Vienna, 1902).

Even the position of slaves was improved by the acceptance of the new philosophy. 'Justice is due even to the lowest of mankind', said Cicero (*De Officiis* 1.41), 'and nothing can be lower than the condition and fortune of a slave'. Slaves should be treated like hired laborers, obliged to do their work, but given their just dues.

M. Gaston Boissier⁹ remarks that improvement in the condition of slaves antedated Christianity, and that the credit for this change should be given to philosophy and not to the new religion. We know how humane was Cicero's attitude toward his own slaves. When his reader Sosithus died, he wrote, 'I am perhaps more grieved than I should be at the death of a slave' (*Ad Att.* 1.12.4). The friendly relations between Cicero and his secretary Tiro are well known. In all their correspondence, declares Dr. Anna B. Miller, in her dissertation¹⁰ (3), there is no reference to their relation as master and slave, nor anything to suggest that these were not letters to some intimate friend; but there is evidence of Cicero's attachment and deferential respect for Tiro's judgment.

The fact that Cicero did not condemn slavery as inconsistent with his philosophy is not to be wondered at. He was by temperament a conservative. His proposals for social betterment involved no break with the past. His political idealism was bound up with reverence for the elder Roman Republic and none of its old institutions could seem evil to him. We have to remember, too, that slavery was formally abolished in our own country only about two generations ago, and that, according to recent evidence, its spirit is still alive and perniciously active.

Cicero believed in democracy with reservations. The object of the State is the creation of a good and happy life for all, he said (*De Re Publica* 4.3), and respect is due to other people's personalities, whether they be of high or low degree (*De Officiis* 1.99). But he also reminds us that the justice which disregards the best and the worst in a people is most unjust (*De Re Publica* 1.53). He faces squarely the fact of natural inequality in mental equipment, a fact to which we modern democrats have closed our eyes so long.

'By what sort of justice can a society be maintained when the condition of the citizens is not equal', he demands. But he adds, immediately, 'If it is not expedient to equalize their money and *not possible to equalize their ability*, at least their legal rights (*iura*) ought to be made equal' (*De Re Publica* 1.49).

Modern biology and psychology combine to correct our old enthusiastic faith in equality. "There is no such word as 'equality' in Nature's lexicon", says a recent writer. "With an increasingly uneven hand she distributes health, beauty, vigor, intelligence, genius,—all the qualities which confer on their possessors superiority over their fellows"¹¹.

Inequality of mental ability makes leadership in-

dispensable to society, Cicero thought. 'Surely the safety of the State depends on the counsels of the best citizens' (*De Re Publica* 1.51). He believed that the early Roman Senate was really superior to the people and maintained its authority by its austere virtue (*De Re Publica* 2.59). The service of leadership to humanity or to the State, which is the most manageable unit of humanity, is an instinct and also a duty (*De Re Publica* 1.3, and *De Officiis* 1.72).

The leadership which seemed essential to Cicero seems indispensable to the moderns also, in their new realization of the inequality of men. I quote again from Wallas (146):

... The very existence of the Great Society requires that there should be found in each generation a certain number of men and women whose care for the good of others is sufficiently reliable and continuous to insure that they carry on the duty of originating leadership.

Professor McDougall's conclusion is that no people ever became a nation unless it produced personalities of exceptional power to play the part of leaders (186). Not only in forming nations, but in maintaining national prestige the value of leadership is supreme (190). So he deplores the mistake of the politicians who wait for a mandate from the mass of the people, ignoring the fact that all initiative must come from the upper level of intelligence (191-192). He even goes so far as to say that political equality bids fair to destroy the weaker nations and perhaps even our own (253).

To Cicero the solidarity of mankind was so real a thing that he asserted that there was no distinction to be made between the good of the individual and that of the whole (*De Officiis* 3.26). Both material and spiritual advantage come to man through society. Gold, silver, and the fruits of the earth are his because men cooperate (*De Officiis* 2.12-13). Virtue, which is incomparably the highest good, can be exercised only in the social life. It is an active, not a passive quality. 'The virtues have for their object, two things—to preserve society and to show forth greatness of soul' (*De Officiis* 1.17). The crown of virtue is justice. Knowledge was the life-long mistress of Cicero's eager, keen intelligence; but in his philosophy she was obliged to take second place. Pursuit of knowledge is justified only when the knowledge is applied to the uses of men. Courage is mere brutality unless it is softened by human intercourse. Justice alone is supreme, 'because it pertains to the service of men, of which nothing ought to take precedence in men's thoughts' (*De Officiis* 1.155), and joined to justice is kindness (*De Officiis* 1.20). Justice and kindness, which Hume called "the double flower of the social instinct", are the two great forces that bind men together. Thus the individual is served because virtue, man's supreme good, comes to flower only in the garden of organized society; and society is served because cooperative life depends for its existence on the justice and kindness of the individual members.

So the individualism that the Stoics brought from Greece was fused in the mind and the life of Cicero with the ancient Roman concept of the supremacy of the body politic. Because Cicero is the perfect repre-

⁹Cicéron et ses Amis, 118 (Paris, 1892).

¹⁰Roman Etiquette in the Late Republic, 3. For a review of this dissertation, by Professor Walter Miller, see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 9.61-62.

¹¹Lothrop Stoddard, The Revolt against Civilization, 31 (New York, 1922).

sentative of this fusion of ideas, a modern critic, Max Schneidewin thinks that he represents the highest level that ancient civilization ever reached, and he has given his book on ancient culture the subtitle of 'Ciceronian Studies'¹².

When he accepts justice and kindness as the foundation stones of society, Cicero rejects, necessarily, two other principles that have been freely used before and since his time.

Fear has played a tragic part in society all through the ages. Cicero shows that no rule of fear is long effective (*De Officiis* 2.23). Those whose liberties have been crushed are the more bitter in their vengeance afterwards. He deplores the change in the policy of his own country, which was wont in olden times to treat its allies with such equity that its government meant protection, not domination of the world (*De Officiis* 2.26-27). But under the régime of Sulla such cruelties were practiced both abroad and at Rome that there seemed no guarantee against civil war. 'Only the walls of our city are left standing. . . and our free government is lost' (*De Officiis* 2.29).

Wallas, voicing the conclusions of psychology and history, condemns fear as a social motive. He calls it "of all human dispositions the least suitable as a general basis for modern government and education. . . . In the past, indeed, the governments which used such means have fallen, or have adopted a new policy"¹³.

The other motive sharply condemned by Cicero and also tried and rejected by modern social science may be called by its modern name, Utilitarianism. We all know with what vehemence Cicero always attacked the Epicurean doctrine that pleasure is the highest good. He asserted that it is not a fundamental motive, not even a primitive motive. Not only is such a doctrine unworthy of the dignity of man (*De Finibus* 1.23), but observation shows us that even babies do not seek pleasure, but rather selfpreservation and freedom from injury (*De Finibus* 2.33). Even animals often act from other motives than pleasure (*De Finibus* 2.109-110).

Cicero also attacked the belief that there is anything essentially useful apart from the just and the honorable. He quotes Socrates as saying that the separation of *ius* and *utilitas* is the root of all evil (*De Legibus* 1.33). The antithesis often made between the useful and the good is based on a false idea of the useful. Between the truly useful and the virtuous act there is no conflict (*De Officiis* 3.11). Good men, as history shows, endure danger and pain and even death by torture, as Regulus did, for the sake of a higher motive than pleasure or personal expediency (*De Finibus* 1.24, 2.65).

The modern psychologists reject pleasure as a basic human motive and utilitarianism as a principle, for much the same reasons as did Cicero. "Pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action", is the statement of McDougall¹⁴. He believes that, because Utilitarianism identified happiness with pleasure, thus

making a fundamental mistake, its position became untenable (154-155). And Wallas adds his testimony (112-113): "The theory that . . . every one could by following his own interests best serve the interests of the whole had hardly any results which were not evil. . . . Utilitarianism died because its central problem of human motives was still unsolved".

The lower motives of fear, selfinterest, and pleasure are rejected by both the ancient and the modern students of society and the higher motives of justice and kindness remain. Another modern writer declares that, as the human race is superior to the animals and so regulates the organization of life with regard to itself and not with regard to the beasts, so social life is organized in accordance with our higher sentiments, not in accordance with our lower¹⁵.

The author of *The Great Society*, as he closes his study, concludes that the right relation to our neighbor is only to be attained through virtue in the individual. This virtue depends not on psychology, but on philosophy, or a general interpretation of the universe (368-369). So the science of psychology admits her limitations. Cicero is vindicated when he founds human society on justice, and justice on man's kinship with the unseen world.

The duty of justice and benevolence and the value of these qualities in political and social relations were not to Cicero mere generalities of a treatise on ethics. They form the theme of a letter written to his brother (*Ad Q. Fratrem* 1.1), when the latter was beginning the third year of his administration of the province of Asia. It is a most practical and definite message, but its wise recommendations are based none the less on the same elevated principles that we have seen set forth in the philosophical treatises. So it is a noble example of Cicero's ideal purpose 'to bring philosophy into the Forum'.

Strict justice is the first essential in governing a province. 'Therefore let there be the utmost rigor in the administration of justice, provided this is not influenced by favor, but is applied with uniformity' (1.20). Cicero commends his brother for the self-control that kept him from the loot of money, statues, and other objects of art in the Asiatic cities (§ 18). Not only must the governor be strictly just himself, but he must see to it that his subordinates conform to the same principle (20). He must see to it that his seal is never used except to indicate his own decisions; his licitor must have no power to dispense favor of his own (13); his slaves must be so strictly curbed in their conduct that they shall behave with as much propriety in Asia as if they were on the Appian Way (17). In short, the governor is responsible to the allies, the citizens, and the State for the conduct of all his entourage (10).

The problem of taxation in the provinces was always a difficult one, aggravated by the insolence of the tax-gatherers (32-33). To protect the provincials from ruin and at the same time to satisfy the pub-

¹²Die Antike Humanität, 19, 20, *et passim* (Berlin, 1902).

¹³The Great Society, 18-19.

¹⁴Social Psychology, 43.

¹⁵C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 348 (New York, 1912).

licani required superhuman virtue. Cicero pointed out the necessity and the justice of taxation in the provinces. First, the Greeks would be taxed under their own constitutions, even if they were not tributaries of Rome. Their own administrators were no less exacting than the Romans, as the people of Caunus found out when they came under the government of Rhodes (33). In the second place, the *Pax Romana* was worth paying for. The Asiatics should remember that only the Roman power protected them from outside aggression and from internal strife. This protection could be maintained only by revenues, and those who profited by it should expect to purchase it with part of their wealth (34).

For the sake of the State as a whole, the tax-gatherers must be kept in friendly relations with the home government; for the sake of justice the allies must not be oppressed. Hence arose the need for compromise and room for the utmost tact in the governor. He had to reconcile these two parties, between whom there was always the maximum of opportunity for irritation.

But Cicero had a clear idea of the line between just and unjust taxation. He commends Quintus for suppressing the tax levied on the provincials by the aediles to defray the expenses of the public games at Rome (26). One man complained that Quintus had taken 200,000 sesterces out of his pocket by this decision). 'How great was your public service', writes Cicero (26), 'when . . . you freed Asia from that heavy and unfair tax of the aediles, at the cost of great private animosity to us'.

Instances of courageous protection of the allies against oppression are not lacking in Cicero's own experience as a provincial governor. Caelius, the aedile, wrote to Cicero asking him to send him a number of panthers for his games at Rome. Cicero replied with cool courtesy that he had given an order to the professional panther hunters to procure the beasts for him (Ad Fam. 2.11.2), but that it would be contrary to his standards to order a public hunt by the citizens of Cibra (Ad Att. 6.1.21).

But to a more serious demand by Caelius that he be permitted to accept gifts from the province of Cilicia to defray the expenses of his games, Cicero replied more severely (Ad Att. 6.1.21):

' . . . I wrote back that I was sorry if it was not known at Rome that not a cent was asked in my province except for debt; and I let him know that I could not allow nor could he accept any subscription; and I warned him, since I really love him, that, as he had brought accusations against others, he should conduct his own life more circumspectly'.

Cicero's friendship for Brutus was put to a severe test about the same time. That austere young saint of the Stoic order did not always bring his philosophy into the Forum, nor did he always apply the noble precepts of the Porch to the practical operations of high finance. He had lent money to the people of Salamis, in Cyprus, at the rate of 48%, while the legal rate was 12%. When the debtors could not pay this extortionate interest, Brutus, not wishing his own great name to appear in so dubious a transaction, sent

an emissary, one Scaptius, to ask Cicero for appointment as prefect of Cyprus, with a troop of fifty horsemen, to collect the debt. Scaptius had a remarkable record of efficiency in this sort of thing. Under a previous administration he had imprisoned the Senate of Salamis in their own Curia till several of them died of hunger. Not only Brutus, but even Atticus brought pressure to bear on Cicero to grant this outrageous privilege. But Cicero steadfastly refused, though he spared no efforts to bring about a compromise between the parties. He writes to Atticus reproachfully (6.2.9):

' . . . Then is this what you ask of me? You, whose face, I swear, I have ever before me when I think on any duty or praiseworthy action, is this, I say, what you ask me to do, to make Scaptius prefect? . . . Shall I ever dare to read or touch those books that you praise after doing such a deed? You have loved Brutus too much, quite too much in this matter, dear Atticus; perhaps I have not loved him enough'.

The books to which Cicero refers are his own books *De Re Publica*, lately published. We note again how genuinely Cicero tried to square his practice with his theory.

The story of Cicero's provincial governorship is not one of high achievement; but, where he failed, he failed, not from selfseeking, but from an effort to balance the good of the provincials with the satisfaction of the knights.

" . . . his conduct", says Professor Tyrrell¹⁶, "compared with that of his predecessor, made his term of office seem to the natives like an angel's visit". In the first glow of enthusiasm, as he set out for the East, he wrote to Atticus, 'I will be all things to all men' (Ad Att. 5.13.2). But this was a difficult undertaking and the net result of his efforts was, to quote Professor Tyrrell again, ". . . he failed to reconcile those irreconcilable things, the interests of the province on the one hand and the interests of the publicani and the great financiers among the nobility on the other. . . ." (3.xxxiv). "When they" did conflict, this best of pro-consuls showed himself only too ready to sacrifice the province" (3.xvi).

This is not an evidence of inconsistency, for Cicero never professed an interest in the province superior to that in the home government. But it probably does show, as the same eminent authority asserts, a lack of the vision that made Caesar see that the provinces were linked, for better or for worse, with the destinies of Imperial Rome and fated for better or worse to decide her future.

Let us return to Cicero's letter of advice to his brother. He insists that to inflexible justice in administration must be added the softer graces of kindness and affability. To the humane Cicero it seemed that the very possession of great power was a reason for gentleness. 'How agreeable must be the affability of a praetor in Asia, where so great a number of our countrymen and allies, where so many cities and so many

¹⁶The Correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero², R. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser, 3.xx (London, 1914).

¹⁷i. e. the *concordia ordinum* and the well-being of the province.

States are observant of one man's nod' (Ad Quintum Fratrem 1.22).

The aim of provincial government, as of all organized society, is the well being of the governed. 'Let all the province be aware how dearly you prize the welfare, the children, the fame and the fortunes of all who are under your command' (13). We get here no hint of any notion of a State versus the individual, with its own interests to be advanced. But the happiness of all, high or low, who make up the State, is to be studied. In the report that Cicero has received of his brother's administration, he notes that 'his ears are open to the complaints of all men; that the poor and helpless always find access not only to his public audiences and tribunals, but even to his house and bed chamber' (25).

As to the principle underlying all these admonitions, we are left in no doubt. It is the same principle that we heard of in the *De Officiis* and in the *De Legibus*, the 'common faith that we owe to all men' (28). 'If fortune had placed you over Africans, or Spaniards, or Gauls, fierce and barbarous nations, still it would have behooved your humanity to take thought for their interests and to promote their advantage and welfare' (27).

But, while mature thought and reflection lead us to a philosophic love of mankind, the warm impulse of the heart attaches us to some more deeply than to others. Cicero goes on to remind Quintus of the bonds of sympathy and gratitude that link him to his Greek subjects. It is from the Greeks that civilization (*humanitas*) has spread to others, and a fit return for this gift is due to them (27). 'I have arrived at all those attainments to which I have attained by means of those studies and arts which have been handed down to us in the monuments and systems of Greece' (28). I note that Cicero does not say, 'We have received literary culture from the Greeks, and in return we owe them good government and justice'. He says that we must offer those by whose precepts we have been trained that very thing which we have learned from their precepts (28). It is Greek moral teaching that is to be illustrated in the forum of Roman provincial government. Cicero had no fear of the scholar in politics. He goes on to quote his master Plato as saying that States would at length achieve happiness, when they were ruled by the wise and the learned (Plato, *Republic* 473 D).

Cicero implies here that the fusion of Greek and Roman civilization produced the highest level of life and thought. For all his patriotism, he is not so narrowly national in his feeling as not to realize what Greece gave Rome. In another passage he tells us that Scipio, Laelius, and Philus, 'in order to omit nothing that adds to the consummate honor of distinguished men, added to our own ancestral character this new learning come from Socrates. He who has the will and the power to apply himself to both, the traditions of our fathers and the new learning, has reached the ideal' (*De Re Publica* 3.3, 5, 6). It is this

union of Roman and Greek elements in one concept of human life, that of the individual man developing all his powers of body, mind, and spirit in a social organization which he gladly and freely serves, that Cicero pictured in his writings and represented in his own life.

In the introduction to his great work, Cicero in *Wandel der Jahrhunderte* (2), Th. Zielinski sets forth four principles as characteristic ideals of our Western civilization. They are (1) the eternal and indestructible worth of all men, no matter how humble their outer circumstances; (2) the duty of active, social service as contrasted with other-worldly contemplation; (3) the right of every man to develop the seeds of his inborn powers; (4) the equality of all men before the law. The theme of Zielinski's book is the influence of Cicero on each of these fundamentals of ethics.

If Cicero's views on justice and benevolence seem to us obvious and commonplace maxims of universal ethics, "good sentences and well pronounced", perhaps the explanation is that they were early incorporated in the body of Christian ethics that is our inheritance. It is not strange that the philosopher who first turned the thoughts of Augustine to God should have had a potent influence on St. Augustine's church. Schneidevin tells us (5) that, after Christianity established itself, the Church Fathers took a more peaceable attitude toward pagan culture. Possession of the culture of the older world became for them part of the "happy freedom" to which the sons of God were heirs. Zielinski devotes a part of his volume to tracing the influence of Cicero in the works of the Fathers. He tells us that, through Minucius Felix, Christianity laid its hand on Cicero and made him its standard-bearer in its battle for inheritance of the ancient world (96). In regard to the work of St. Ambrose on *Duties*, Zielinski says (116), 'Through Ambrosius the ethical system of Cicero became the acknowledged system of Christian ethics'¹⁸.

As for the extent to which these principles, at once Ciceronian and Christian, are applied in social and national and international relations we can all judge for ourselves. It seems to some of us that a little more international spirit breathed into our natural and commendable nationalism would ennoble the latter. The ideal of service to the general good, and the concept of the sacred value of all human beings have left many fields of life almost untouched. But, as Cicero himself said (*De Officiis* 1.46), 'We are not living among men who are perfectly good or wise. . . , but among those who do well if they show forth the likeness of the virtues'. When our teachers of sociology, who have for their sole purpose the solution of modern social problems, base their practical recommendations on these age-old principles, we have the right to hope that they will one day bear fruit.

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¹⁸For a detailed comparison of Cicero and St. Ambrose, see the treatise of J. Reeb, *Über die Grundlagen des Sittlichen nach Cicero und Ambrosius* (Zweibrücken, 1876).